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Abstract: Along with the USA and Russia, China is often considered one of the leading cyber-
powers in the world. In this excerpt, we explore how Chinese military thought, developed in the 
1990’s, influenced their cyber-operations in the early 2000’s. In particular, we examine the ideas 
of Unrestricted Warfare and Active Offense and discuss how they can permit for the theft of 
intellectual property.  We then specifically look at how the case study of Operation Aurora – a 
cyber-operation directed against many major U.S. technology and defense firms, reflects some 
of these ideas. 
 
 
Over the past five years, the news media is seemingly littered with alleged Chinese cyber-
incidents. These activities have included instances of theft of guarded scientific data,1 
monitoring of communication of the Dalai Lama,2 and theft of intellectual property from 
Google.3 In a testimony to the Congressional Armed Services Committee, General Keith 
Alexander, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command and head of the National Security Agency 
(NSA), stated that China is stealing a “great deal” of military-related intellectual property from 
the U.S.4 Clearly, cyber-espionage, which includes the theft of intellectual property, is already a 
key component of Chinese cyber-strategy.  The recently released report by the security firm 
Mandiant provides technical analysis leading to the conclusion that an organization within the 
People’s Liberation Army (Unit 61398) has been responsible for a great deal of cyber-espionage 
against English-speaking countries.5  In this paper, we highlight some of the relevant Chinese 
doctrine that we believe led to organizations like Unit 61398 and others. 
 
 The activities of exfiltration, monitoring, and theft of digital information described here 
can be easily labeled as incidents of cyber-espionage. The apparent goal of this type of cyber-
operation is not to take the computers offline or destroy the data that they contain but rather 
to capture data of the opposing force. This being the case, such activities could not be labeled 
as cyber-attacks, because the targeted systems and their data must remain intact in order to 
obtain the desired data. Hence, we can define cyber-espionage as the act of obtaining access to 
data from a computer system without the authorization of that system’s owner for intelligence 
collection purposes. 
 
 However, like incidents of computer network attack, these incidents of cyber-espionage 
too are notoriously difficult to attribute. What then, leads us to believe Chinese involvement in 
 
 
the cyber-espionage incidents? If attribution is so difficult, then why do these actions cause 
corporations like Google and Northrop Grumman, as well as high-level diplomats such as U.S. 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to issue strong statements against the Chinese government in 
the wake of such attacks? The issue lies in the origin of the incidents.6 Often computers 
involved with the theft of digital information are traced back to networks that are located on 
the Chinese mainland. Further, forensic analysis of malware from such incidents often indicates 
the use of Chinese-language software development tools. Though it is virtually impossible to 
implicate the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in these cyber-espionage 
actions, the fact that they can be consistently traced to the Chinese mainland raises serious 
policy questions. Is the Chinese government conducting active investigations against the 
hackers, and what legal actions are they taking once hackers are identified? Is the Chinese 
government transparently sharing information of these supposed investigations with the 
victims of the cyber-espionage? What legal actions is Beijing taking to prevent individual 
hackers from attacking organizations outside of China? These questions must be given serious 
consideration in the wake of attempted cyber-espionage to when there is evidence of Chinese 
origin. 
 
What would China have to gain by offering a permissive environment for hackers? It is 
unlikely that the Chinese government - hallmarked by state monitoring7 - would not have the 
resources to reduce such activity. It can further be expected that the fire drawn by the 
international community is diplomatically undesirable. These activities provide key benefits to 
the PRC. The nature of the stolen information – which ranges from details of American 
weaponry and trade secrets to the communications of the Dalai Lama – are all of highly 
particular interest to Beijing. Further, in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s several Chinese 
military thinkers wrote on the topic cyber-warfare.8 These writings indicate that obtaining 
unauthorized access to computer systems for the purpose of information exfiltration is an 
integral part of Chinese cyber-strategy. 
 
To understand Chinese doctrine, we must consider how that nation’s culture and 
traditions have shaped their military thinking in ways vastly different from the West.  In a SANS 
paper,9 COL Edward Sobiesk highlights an example that illustrates the vast differences in 
Western and Chinese thought that is noted in a 2002 Report to Congress on The Military Power 
of the PRC by the US Secretary of Defense.10 This report identifies one of China’s strategic 
objectives as maximizing “strategic configuration of power” called “shi.” In the report, a 
footnote for “shi” states “There is no Western equivalent to the concept of ‘shi’. Chinese 
linguists explain it as ‘the alignment of forces,’ the ‘propensity of things,’ or ‘potential born of 
disposition,’ that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force.” 
Another interpretation of “shi” could focus on setting favorable conditions. If a nation state 
attains a higher level of “shi” than a rival, the latter will be easily defeated when conflict does 
arise, because any battle (if even necessary) will be conducted in conditions extremely 
favorable to the first nation – as the first nation has already set favorable conditions through 
the attainment of “shi”. By attaining a high-level of access to an adversary’s active computer 
systems – the information stored on those systems has lost two critical aspects – confidentiality 
and integrity.11 Confidentiality ensures that the information is not viewed by unauthorized 
 
 
individuals, while integrity ensures that the information, once retrieved, was not tampered 
with. Taking away these aspects of an adversary’s information can contribute greatly to setting 
the conditions of the battlefield – perhaps even avoiding battle all-together. Considering “shi” 
cyber-espionage appears to be a formidable strategic tool – by accessing the opponent’s 
computer systems, the rival’s information advantage is reduced while the same is gained on the 
initiating side. 
 
From Active Defense to Active Offense 
 
 Traditionally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was focused on the traditional Chinese 
idea of “active defense” which refers to the idea of not initiating conflict, but being prepared to 
respond to aggression.12 In a 2008 Military Review article, Timothy Thomas points out that the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s saw a shift from this mentality, particularly with regard to cyber-
warfare. The paradigm that seemed to emerge at this time was “active offense.” Under this 
new rubric, the idea of setting the conditions of the battlefield (i.e. developing “shi”) is still pre-
eminent but the manner in which it is pursued takes a different turn. In the cyber-arena this 
entails not only building one’s defenses to deter attack, but utilizing cyber-operations to obtain 
the upper hand in the case of a larger conflict. 
 
 This idea of “active offense” is introduced in the 1999 book Information War by Zhu 
Wenguan and Chen Taiyi. In this book, they include a section entitled “Conducting Camouflaged 
Attacks” where pre-emption and active-offense are laid out.13 A key component of active-
offense is network surveillance which includes obtaining an understanding of an opponent’s 
command and control (C2), electronic warfare (EW), and key weapon systems. In 2002 and 
2003, General Dai Qingmin echoes some of these ideas.14 He stresses that it is necessary for 
information and cyber operations to be both “precursory” (i.e. done before operations take 
place) and “whole course” (performed throughout the operation). Where does cyber-espionage 
fit into this schema? Pre-emption can take many forms. For instance, Russian hackers leveraged 
denial of service cyber-attacks in the early phases of the Georgia campaign to hamper the 
opposing force’s government, banking, and news media websites. However pre-emption can 
take other, more subtle forms as well. For example, having constant access to the Tibetian 
information systems would certainly be an advantage and would perhaps yield the possibility to 
avoid open conflict altogether. Theft of military secrets relating to new weapon systems may 
give the Chinese the technical intelligence (TECHINT) needed to find vulnerabilities, or even 
develop their own copies of said weapons. Stealing intellectual property from software vendors 
may give Chinese hackers a wealth of insight needed to identify new vulnerabilities for future 
cyber-attack and cyber-espionage operations. 
 
 The work Information War and the writings of General Dai illustrate the importance of 
the cyber-aspect to Chinese military operations. However, many of the cyber-espionage 
incidents that we will discuss in this paper deal with theft of information from private 
companies during peace-time. How is this accounted for in the Chinese literature on cyber-
warfare? Answers to questions of this type seem to lay in the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare 
 
 
by PLA Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.15 In this work, the authors assert that modern 
warfare extends beyond simply a military domain. Modern warfare includes political, scientific, 
and economic leaders in addition to military personnel. The notion of “unrestricted” warfare 
extends not only the domains of war, but also the time at which such actions of war can take 
place. “Military” operations –that now include information, economic, and psychological 
aspects, can take place in peacetime in this perspective – further supporting the notion of 
“active offense.” This may help explain why the early 21st century has been littered with stories 
of Chinese cyber-espionage against corporations and scientific laboratories. 
 
 In this same vein, Colonel Wang Wei and Major Yang Zhen of the Nanjing Military 
Academy’s Information Warfare and Command Department wrote in China Military Science 
that in a war against an information-centric society, a nation’s political system, economic 
potential, and strategic objectives will be high-value targets.16 They then go on to describe that 
the preferred method to attack such a society would be through the use of asymmetric warfare 
techniques. Asymmetric warfare refers to the ability of a combatant to defeat a superior force 
by using tactics that exploit a major weakness in their weapon systems, tactics, or information 
technology. In the America’s war in Iraq from 2003-2011, insurgent often used asymmetric 
attacks such as road-side bombs as opposed to more traditional attacks that would otherwise 
expose them to the superior firepower of the Americans. Colonel Wei and Major Zhen espouse 
asymmetric attacks on a more strategic level – specifically calling for peacetime operations 
which have military and economic goals. To achieve such goals, under “informatized 
conditions” they state that both economic and trade warfare must be carried out.17 Clearly, 
these authors were influenced by the earlier ideas of Unrestricted Warfare. It seems that the 
peacetime cyber-espionage operations launched from the Chinese mainland against scientific, 
military, and commercial targets align well with this line of thinking. 
 
 Another line of thought in Chinese writing to justify their seemingly bold moves in 
cyber-space is that they believe these activities can be done with relative impunity. In a 2009 
article in China Military Science, Senior Colonel Long Fangcheng and Senior Colonel Li Decai 
state that cyber-operations directed against social, economic, and political targets can be done 
without fear of such activities leading to large-scale military engagements.18 As such is the case, 
they generally regard cyber-warfare as an element of soft-power – albeit one with great effects. 
They then proceed to claim that the ultimate effect of this highly effective form of soft-power is 
that the line between peacetime and wartime becomes blurred. This blurring may be a 
hallmark of cyber-operations in general and might lead to the metaphorical endless war in the 
near future. 
 
INEW and Cyber in the PLA 
 
The general information warfare (IW) strategy in use by the PLA is known as Integrated 
Network Electronic Warfare (INEW).19 This strategy was originally outlined in a book by General 
Dai Qingmin in 1999 known as On Information Warfare. This integration of cyber-operations to 
traditional information warfare assets is a key component of the INEW strategy. INEW relies on 
 
 
simultaneous application of both electronic warfare and cyber-operations to overwhelm an 
adversary’s command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR). Hence, the mission of key pieces of cyber-warfare (cyber-attack, cyber-
espionage, and cyber-defense) – are assigned to elements of the PLA General Staff traditionally 
given similar roles in electronic warfare. 
The General Staff of the PLA is divided into several departments. INEW generally assigns 
offensive tasks (cyber-attack and more conventional electronic counter measures (ECM)) to the 
4th Department – which has traditionally played a large role in offensive information warfare.20 
Notably, General Dai Qingmin was promoted to the head of the 4th Department in 2000 – 
perhaps an indication that the PLA intended to adopt his vision of INEW. Defensive and 
intelligence tasks – specifically cyber-defense and cyber-espionage are assigned to the 3rd 
Department – which traditionally focused on signal intelligence (SIGINT).21 It is thought that the 
3rd Department is the headquarters for the Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus, whose normal 
mission is SIGINT collection. In the late 1990’s several of these Bureaus received awards relating 
to research in information warfare.22 Some analysts believe this indicates their role in cyber-
operations.23 
 
 To augment the information warfare specialists in the 3rd and 4th GSD’s the Chinese have 
also established information warfare militia units.24 These militias can be thought of as a “cyber 
national guard” as they consist largely of personnel from the commercial information 
technology (IT) and academia. Open-source reporting indicates that these units have been 
created from 2003-2008 in Guangzhou, Tianjin, Henan, and Ningxia provinces.25 There is even 
evidence that some of these militia received specific wartime tasks – most of which appear to 
be focused on cyber-attack.26 
 
 The main ideas of Chinese cyber-operations grew out of the writings of PLA officers in 
the late 1990’s and ultimately implemented in the INEW strategy, which aligns cyber-attack and 
cyber-espionage responsibilities with organizations conducting similar operations in the realm 
of electronic warfare.27 Though the Chinese hacker community came to prominence in the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s with attacks that seemingly had goals congruent to the government, 
the PRC ultimately disapproved of these actions.28 As a result, many of the hackers turned 
“white hat” by either transforming their hacker groups into consulting firms or by obtaining 
employment with the government and/or academia.29 Chinese academia also appears to be 
highly involved with cyber-warfare – not only in research but also potentially with operations.30 
 
A Case Study in Cyber War through Intellectual Property Theft: Operation 
Aurora 
 
On January 12th, 2010, Google announced shocking news. The firm published on its official blog 
that it had been the victim of a cyber-warfare originating from China. According to the blog, the 
purpose of the operation was to access the Gmail email-accounts of Chinese human rights 
activists.31 As a result of this cyber-espionage operation, Google announced that it would no 
longer censor results on its flagship search engine in China – google.cn – a move that caused 
 
 
consternation with the PRC. The company stated that if they could not run their search engine 
uncensored, they would be willing to close operations in China. 
 
Literally minutes after the announcement from Google, Adobe - another major software 
vendor - announced that their corporate systems had also been hacked.32 It turns out that both 
Google and Adobe were targets of the same adversary – an adversary that conducted the very 
same operation against thirty-two more companies. These firms included Dow Chemical, 
Northrop Grumman, Symantec, and Yahoo.33 It seems the purpose of the operation was to 
exfiltrate not only information about Chinese human rights activists, but intellectual property as 
well – namely source code of commercially developed software.34 
 
 This operation – known as “Operation Aurora” - is the topic of this section. It leveraged 
social engineering along with an advanced Trojan known as Hydraq to steal intellectual 
property.  Several analysts strongly suspect PRC involvement. Here we review the attack, 
review the evidence of PRC involvement, and discuss the implications of intellectual property 
theft from corporations. 
 
 This act of cyber-espionage employed a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer that 
was exploited by software referred to as Trojan.Hydraq by the Security firm Symantec. As with 
several of the cyber-espionage operations discussed in this paper, Operation Aurora was 
initiated with spear phishing. In the case of the Google break-in, it is thought that this initial 
spear phishing was directed at an employee using the Microsoft Messenger instant chat 
software. The user supposedly received a link to a malicious website during one of his chat.35 It 
is unknown, if the operations against the other firms were also initiated with chat software. 
Based on similar operations it seems likely that email may have also been used as a way to 
initiate the infiltration of the malicious software. Either way, the initial communication to these 
firms had three characteristics. First, they were sent to a select group of individuals, which 
suggests that this type of targeting (spear phishing) indicates that the hackers had some 
additional source of intelligence on their targets. Second, the communications were engineered 
in a way to appear as though they originated from a trusted source, which also shows that the 
perpetrators were operating with profiles of their targets. Third, they all contained a link to a 
website – clicking upon which initiated a certain series of events. 
 
 Once the user clicked on the link, their web browser would visit a site based out of 
Taiwan. This website, in turn, executed malicious JavaScript code – this is source code that runs 
on a website normally used to provide interactive features to the user. The malicious JavaScript 
code exploited a weakness in the Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser that was largely 
unknown at the time. Often such a new vulnerability is termed a “zero-day exploit”. The 
malevolent JavaScript code proceeds to download a second piece of malware from Taiwan - 
disguised as an image file. This secondary malicious software would proceed to run in Windows 
and set up a back door allowing a cyber-spy access to the targeted system.36 A back door refers 
to a method of accessing a system that allows an intruder to circumvent the normal security 
mechanism.  The use of a zero-day exploit is significant because identifying such a vulnerability 
most likely required a skillful engineering effort. This, along with the highly-targeted spear-
 
 
phishing campaign (suggesting that the hackers had access to some additional intelligence on 
their targets), might hint at the backing of a larger organization – possibly a nation-state. 
 
Theft of Intellectual Property 
 
Several months after Google announced that it had been hacked, the New York Times reported 
that more than just email accounts of Chinese human rights activists had been compromised. 
Citing an unnamed source with direct knowledge of the Google investigation, reporter John 
Markoff wrote that the source code to Google’s state of the art password system had likely 
been stolen during Operation Aurora.37 The system, known as Gaia, was designed to allow 
users of Google’s software to use a single username and password to access the myriad of 
Google services. This software is also known as “Single Sign-On.” Markoff reported that Google 
addressed the problem by adding an additional layer of encryption to their password system. 
 
The compromise of Gaia is significant for more than one reason. First, obtaining 
software source code of a commercial system is intellectual property theft and thus unlawful in 
the U.S. As with the data stolen during Titan Rain, the stolen source code could allow certain 
developers to illicitly create software similar to Gaia. If we view Operation Aurora as the actions 
of a nation state, theft of intellectual property can be thought of as a form of economic warfare 
– leveling the technological playing field in order to reduce the advantage of an adversary 
nation’s industrial capability. Clearly, this is in line with the Chinese ideas of Unrestricted 
Warfare – where various forms of information warfare occur constantly (including during 
peacetime) and attack all aspects of a nation’s power (including industry). 
 
However, beyond the economic advantages gained by the theft of source code, major 
security implications are also imminent – particularly in the case of Gaia. For instance, analysts 
working with the hackers would most likely determine technical vulnerabilities in the password 
system. 
 
 Though it is clear that the theft of intellectual property is an important consideration for 
corporations, it also raises an important question. How were the attackers able to obtain 
source code for a system such as Gaia by leveraging a relatively small number of compromised 
computer systems? It turns out that many corporations work with specialized servers as store-
houses for this type of data – often fittingly termed “intellectual property repositories.” 
Centralized locations of this type of data make it easier for teams to work collaboratively on a 
project and share information with each other. These systems often take the form of Software 
Configuration Management (SCM) systems such as IBM Rationale© or content management 
systems such as Microsoft SharePoint©. 
 
 Operation Aurora invalidated a key assumption made by many system administrators 
and IP repository software vendors at the time. The professionals operating those networks 
assumed that the intellectual property would not be accessed due to security countermeasures 
taken to protect the network as a whole. The result of this perspective is a lesser focus on the 
 
 
security of an IP repository lying within the perimeter of a corporation’s network. By utilizing a 
zero-day vulnerability for their mission, the perpetrators behind Operation Aurora were able to 
exploit this assumption. 
 
Theft of intellectual property presents another key difficulty – determining what was 
actually stolen. In the wake of Operation Aurora, security researcher George Kurtz wrote an 
article entitled “Where’s the body?”38 As opposed to a physical theft where it is relatively easy 
to determine what was stolen, with cyber-espionage and data-exfiltration this is much more 
difficult to establish. Though systems administrators have a few tools at hand -  such as the 
examination of server logs and the analysis of network traffic - in advanced cyber-espionage 
operations hackers often take various steps to cover-up their tracks and operate in a manner, 
which makes it difficult to ascertain what data was stolen.  Though security vendors provide 
software solutions to help with this issue, determining “where’s the body” in the wake of a 
cyber-espionage operation is still often a difficult task. 
 
Indicators of PRC Involvement 
 
It is interesting that Google’s announcement of the security breach seems to implicate Chinese 
involvement – or suggests at least complacency on the side of the government. Here are some 
indicators that Operation Aurora was executed with the full knowledge or even under the 
directive of the Chinese government. 
 
The earliest signs of Chinese involvement were made public in January 2010 – several 
weeks after Google’s initial blog post. A report released by the security firm VeriSign stated that 
the “source IP’s and drop server of the attack correspond to a single foreign entity consisting of 
either agents of the Chinese state or proxies thereof.”39 The researchers at VeriSign also found 
that the Aurora hackers used HomeLinux DynamicDNS and “borrowed” IP addresses from the 
American firm Linode (a company specializing in Virtual Private Server Hosting). These are the 
same circumstances as in a July 2009 DDoS attacks against South Korea and Washington, D.C. 
When considered with other similarities, VeriSign researchers concluded that Aurora and the 
attacks against Washington, D.C. and South Korea were possibly conducted by the same entity. 
 
Just a few weeks later, New York Times reporters John Markoff and David Barboza 
published an article which stated that investigators had identified two Chinese schools of higher 
education involved in the attack40 - Shanghai Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang Vocational 
School. The former’s Information Security Engineering Institute is the workplace of Peng Yinan 
(alleged to be the Chinese hacker “CoolSwallow”). When New York Times reporters conducted 
an anonymous telephone interview with a professor from that institute, they were surprised 
with the candid response. He stated that students hacking into foreign computer networks 
were “quite normal”.41 However, as an alternate explanation, the professor stated that the 
university’s IP address could also have been hijacked which he said “frequently happens”.42 
At the Lanxiang Vocational School, the investigators were able to identify a specific class taught 
by a Ukrainian professor suspected to be involved in Operation Aurora.43 When confronted 
 
 
with the suspicion, the dean of the computer science department there (identified in the media 
only as Mr. Shao) stated that the students at the school simply would not have the ability to 
carry out such an attack. However, he did acknowledge that students from the school were 
often recruited into the military.44 
 
The reports of Chinese involvement might have inspired U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton’s speech on Internet freedom given shortly after Google’s announcement.45 In this 
speech she called upon China to perform a transparent investigation on the intrusions into 
Google. This was perhaps the strongest statement by a high-ranking U.S. government official 
made in response to a cyber-warfare incident at the time. 
 
 Operation Aurora illustrates the continued evolution of cyber-espionage in the early 21st 
century. In this case of cyber-espionage the targeted information was deemed so important 
that the operators utilized a zero-day exploit and spear-phishing to gain access to corporate 
systems, locate the target’s intellectual property repositories, and steal company secrets. 
Originally reported by Google, this operation affected over thirty big-name companies. The 
stolen information was unlikely to only further economic gain, but is also feasibly beneficial for 
technical intelligence, such as the evaluation of vulnerabilities – possibly for use in further 
cyber-attacks. Operation Aurora invalidated existing assumptions about the security of 
intellectual property repositories in corporations and again highlighted the difficulty of 
determining the specifics of the captured data. The news media accounts of potential 
involvement of China led to a diplomatic statement by the U.S. Secretary of State. Operation 
Aurora is not unique. In its aftermath, there have been other Chinese-attributed cyber 
maneuvers performed with the goal of stealing intellectual property. A series of events known 
as Nitro46 (directed against the chemical industry) and Night Dragon47 (against the energy 
sector) are but two examples. Finally, there are many potential second and third order effects 
of a major software vendor such as Google or Adobe being hacked. It is unknown what 
consequences the knowledge of potentially widely-used software, such as Google’s Gaia 
password system, will have in follow-on cyber-operations. Though currently not connected to 
Aurora, it was recently revealed that Adobe’s software certificate system was hacked – allowing 
malicious software to create seemingly safe add-ons too many of that firm’s software.48 In this 
case, a development server at Adobe was broken into. It is a clear example of how the cyber-
security of a major software vendor’s own systems can have a direct impact on an extremely 
large population of users – hence potentially providing ample opportunities to an adversary 
conducting follow-on cyber-attacks. 
 
---- 
 
 Here we discussed several ideas espoused by China’s military thinkers on information 
warfare – highlighting the ideas of Unrestricted Warfare – in which cyber operations are 
thought to extend into peacetime and involves military, political, economic, and scientific 
domains. We looked at how the Chinese structured their cyber-warriors around the INEW 
strategy. In the PLA, cyber-operations were put under the responsibility of organizations with 
similar missions in the realm of electronic warfare. Finally, we saw how some of these ideas 
 
 
may have been put into practice with Operation Aurora where a zero-day exploit allowed 
operators to steal intellectual property from repositories at Google, Adobe, and many other 
major companies in late 2009. 
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